Abstract. Adaptive oblivious transfer (adaptive OT) schemes have wide applications such as oblivious database searches, secure multiparty computation and etc. It is a two-party protocol which simulates an ideal world such that the sender sends M1, · · · , Mn to the trusted third party (TTP) first, and then the receiver receives Mσ i from TTP adaptively for i = 1, 2, · · · k. In the standard model, however, the fully simulatable schemes known so far had to rely on dynamic assumptions such as q-strong DH assumption, q-PDDH assumption and q-hidden LRSW assumption. This paper shows two fully simulatable adaptive OT schemes which do not rely on dynamic assumptions in the standard model. Our first scheme holds under the DDH assumption and our second scheme holds under the Paillier's decisional N th residuosity assumption, respectively.
Introduction
The basic 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer [6] , OT 2 1 , is a two-party protocol which realizes the ideal world such that the sender sends two strings M 0 and M 1 to the trusted third party (TTP), and the receiver receives M σ from TTP, where σ ∈ {0, 1}. Note that the sender learns nothing on σ, and the receiver learns nothing on M 1−σ . Non-adaptive k-out-of-n oblivious transfer, OT n k , is defined similarly [1, 15] . Efficient OT schemes are important because OT 4 1 is a key building block for secure multi-party computation [21, 9, 12] .
Adaptive k-out-of-n oblivious transfer, denoted by OT n k×1 , was introduced by Naor and Pinkas [16] . In the ideal world of this model, the sender sends M 1 , · · · , M n to TTP, and the receiver receives M σi adaptively from TTP, where the choice index σ i+1 can depend on M σ1 , · · · , M σi .
On the definition of security, only half simulatability (for both non-adaptive and adaptive) was considered until recently [16, 17, 11, 19] . This definition requires that for any receiver R in the real world, there exists a receiverR in the ideal world such that the outputs of R andR are indistinguishable. For the receiver's privacy, it is only required that the view of the sender must be indistinguishable for any input to the receiver. Note that the honest sender outputs nothing in OT n k×1 . However, Naor and Pinkas noticed that there can be a practical attack on the receiver's privacy in a half simulatable adaptive OT [16] .
To solve this problem, Camenisch, Neven and shelat formalized a notion of full simulatability [5] . In this definition, we consider the output of the sender as well. For example, a malicious sender may output its view in the execution of the protocol. Full simulatability now requires that, in addition to half simulatability, for any sender S in the real world, there exists a senderŜ in the ideal world such that (Ŝ out ,R out ) is indistinguishable from (S out , R out ), where A out denotes the output of A. Then they showed a fully simulatable adaptive OT in the random oracle model, and one in the standard model, respectively.
We focus on the standard model in this paper. Then all the constructions of fully simulatable adaptive OT known so far rely on dynamic assumptions (which depend on n). The scheme of Camenisch et al. relies on q-strong DH assumption and q-PDDH assumption. The scheme of Green and Hohenberger relies on qhidden LRSW assumption [8] . The scheme of Jarecki and Liu proposed relies on the decisional q-DHI assumption [10] .
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On the other hand, Lindell showed a fully simulatable OT 2 1 under DDH, Paillier's decisional N th residuosity, and qudratic residuosity assumptions as well as under the assmption that homomorphic encryption exists in the standard model [14] .
This paper shows two fully simulatable adaptive OT schemes in the standard model which do not rely on dynamic assumptions. Our first scheme holds under the DDH assumption and our second scheme holds under the Paillier's decisional N th residuosity assumption (DCNR assumption), respectively. They are very simple and efficient. In each scheme, the initialization phase and each transfer phase are constant round protocols. Hence the total round complexity is proportional to k.
While the previous schemes use signature scheme as a building block, our first scheme uses ElGamal encryption scheme, and our second scheme uses Paillier's encryption scheme, respectively. (Hence we do not need a bilinear map.) As a special case, we obtain more efficient fully simulatable OT 2 1 s than Lindell [14] . Finally we show an extension of our schemes to constant round non-adaptive OT n k s, where the choice index σ i+1 cannot depend on M σ1 , · · · , M σi . Green and Hohenberger showed a fully simulatable non-adaptive OT n k under the decisional BDH assumption in the standard model [7] . Note that, on the other hand, our first OT n k relies on the DDH assumption, and our second OT n k relies on the DCNR assumption.
Preliminaries

Notations
In this paper, we denote a security parameter by τ ∈ N. All the algorithms take τ as the first input and run in (expected) polynomial-time in τ . We denote prob- Table 1 . Fully simulatable adaptive OT without RO Camenisch et al. [5] q-strong DH assumption and q-PDDH assumption Green and Hohenberger [8] q-hidden LRSW assumption Jarecki and Liu [10] q-DHI assumption Proposed (1) DDH assumption Proposed (2) Paillier's DCNR assumption abilistic polynomial-time by ppt for short. We often do not write the security parameter explicitly.
Proof Systems
To design our scheme, we use several proof systems. We follow the definitions described in [3] [4] [5] .
* be a binary relation R such that |β| ≤ poly(α) for all (α, β) ∈ R, where poly is some polynomial. We only consider the relation R such that (α, β) ∈ R can be decided in polynomial in |α| for all (α, β).
Proof of Membership (PoM): A pair of interacting algorithms (P, V), called a prover and a verifier, is a proof of membership (PoM) for a relation R if the completeness and soundness are satisfied. Here, we say that (P, V) satisfies the completeness if for all (α, β) ∈ R, the probability of V(α) accepting a conversation with P(α, β) is 1. Also we say that (P, V) satisfies the soundness if for all α ∈ L R and all P * (α) (including cheating provers), the probability of V(α) accepting the conversation with P * is negligible in |α|. We say that this probability as soundness error of the proof system.
Proof of Knowledge (PoK):
We say a pair of interacting algorithms (P, V) is PoK for a relation R with knowledge error κ ∈ [0, 1] if it satisfies completeness described above and has an expected polynomial-time algorithm, called knowledge extractor, E. The algorithm E is a knowledge extractor for a relation R if possibly cheating P has probability of convincing V to accept α, then E, when given black-box access to P, outputs a witness β for α with probability − κ.
Witness Indistinguishability (WI): A proof system (P, V) is perfect WI if for every (α, β 1 ), (α, β 2 ) ∈ R, and any ppt cheating verifier, the output of V(α) (including cheating verifier) after interacting with P(β 1 ) and that of V(α) after interacting with P(β 2 ) are identically distributed.
Zero Knowledge (ZK): We say that a proof system (P, V) is perfect ZK if there exists an expected polynomial-time algorithm Sim, called a simulator, such that for any ppt cheating verifier V and any (α, β) ∈ R, the outputs of V(α) after interacting with P(β) and that of Sim V(α) (α) are identically distributed.
k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer
We consider a weak model of UC framework as follows.
-At the beginning of the game, an adversary A can corrupt either a sender S or a receiver R, but not both. -A can send a message (which will be denoted by A out ) to an environment Z after the end of the protocol. (A cannot communicate with Z during the protocol execution.)
The ideal functionalities of OT n k and OT n k×1 will be shown below. For a protcol π = (S, R), define Adv(Z) as Adv(Z) = | Pr(Z = 1 in the real world) − Pr(Z = 1 in the ideal world)|
Non-Adaptive k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer
In the ideal world of OT n k , the ideal functionality F non , an ideal world adversary A and an environment Z behave as follows.
The initialization phase:
The transfer phase: 
After the end of the protocol, A sends a message A out to Z. Finally Z outputs 1 or 0. In the real world, a protocol (S, R) is executed without F non , where the environment Z and a real world adversary A behave in the same way as above. Definition 1. We say that (S, R) is secure against the sender (receiver) corruption if for any real world adversary A who corrupts the sender S (the receiver R), there exists an ideal world adversary A who corrupts the dummy sender S (the dummy receiver R ) such that for any environment Z, Adv(Z) is negligible.
Definition 2. We say that (S, R) is a fully simulatable OT n k if it is secure against the sender corruption and the receiver corruption.
Adaptive k-out-of-n Oblivious Transfer
In the ideal world of OT n k×1 , the ideal functionality F adapt , an ideal world adversary A and an environment Z behave as follows.
After the end of the protocol, A sends a message A out to Z. Finally Z outputs 1 or 0.
In the real world, a protocol (S, R) is executed without F adapt , where the environment Z and a real world adversary A behave in the same way as above.
Definition 3. We say that (S, R) is secure against the sender (receiver) corruption if for any real world adversary A who corrupts the sender S (the receiver R), there exists an ideal world adversary A who corrupts the dummy sender S (the dummy receiver R ) such that for any environment Z, Adv(Z) is negligible. Definition 4. We say that (S, R) is a fully simulatable OT n k×1 if it is secure against the sender corruption and the receiver corruption.
Remarks
The full simulation security of OT n k has never been defined (even in [7] ). On the full simulation security of OT n k×1 , our definition is weaker than the UC security because our adversaries A cannot communicate with Z during the protocol execution.
On the other hand, it is stronger than that of [5] because Z chooses σ i in our definition. Hence σ i can depend on (M 1 , · · · , M n ). In the definition of [5] , σ i can depend on (M σ1 , · · · , M σi−1 ) only because the receiver chooses σ i .
n k×1 Based on ElGamal
In this section, we show an adaptive OT n k×1 based on ElGamal encryption scheme, and prove its full simulatability under the DDH assumption.
Let G be a multiplicative group of prime order q. Then the DDH assumption states that, for every ppt distinguisher D,
is negligible, where the probability is taken over the random bits of D, the random choice of the generator g, and the random choice of α, β, γ ∈ Z q . We denote
where the maximum is taken over all ppt distinguishers D.
The initialization phase and each transfer phase are constant round protocols. Hence the total round complexity is proportional to k.
Initialization Phase
The sender chooses G, g and (x
n+1 randomly, and computes h = g r . 2. For i = 1, · · · , n, the sender computes
In loss of generality, we assume that M 1 , · · · , M n ∈ G. 3. The sender sends (G, h, C 1 , · · · , C n ). 4. The sender proves by ZK-PoK that he knows r.
The protocol stops if the receiver rejects.
The jth Transfer Phase 1. The receiver chooses a choice index 1 ≤ σ j ≤ n based on M σ1 , · · · , M σj−1 . 2. The receiver chooses u ∈ Z q randomly and computes U = (A σj ) u . He then sends U . 3. The receiver proves in WI-PoK that he knows u such that
The protocol stops if the sender rejects. 4. The sender computes V = U r and sends V . 5. The sender proves that (g, h, U, V ) in ZK-PoM that it is a DDH-tuple.
The protocol stops if the reeiver rejects. 6. The receiver obtains M σj by computing B σj /V 1/u .
There are three proof systems employed in this scheme. The first proof system can be obtained by transforming the Schnorr's identification scheme [20] into perfect ZK-PoK with [3] . The second proof system is implemented by the orcomposition [4] of [20] . The third one comes from the Chaum's ZK-PoM for the DDH-tuple [2] . Note that all of these proof systems run in the constant round. More precisely, these systems are four-round, three-round, and four-round protocols, respectively.
Theorem 1.
The above protocol is a fully-simulatable adaptive OT n k×1 under the DDH assumption.
The proof is included in Section 7. We use a simple fact that given (g, h, g
where z 1 , · · · , z n are random. Similar observation can be found in [18, 13] . In fact, we use [18] to prove the security.
Our OT n k×1 Based on Paillier
In this section, we show an adaptive OT n k×1 based on Paillier encryption scheme, and prove its full simulatability under the Decisional Composite N th Residuosity (DCNR) assumption. The DCNR assumption is stated as follows. Let N = pq where p and q are large primes. Then given N , it is hard to distinguish between Z * N 2 and {y | y = x N mod N 2 , where x ∈ Z * N }. The initialization phase and each transfer phase are constant round protocols. Hence the total round complexity is proportional to k.
Scheme
Initialization Phase 1. The sender chooses two large primes p, q and computes N = pq. 2. For i = 1, · · · , n, the sender chooses r i ∈ Z * N randomly and computes
The sender proves by ZK-PoM that f N (x) = x N mod N is bijective. The protocol stops if the receiver rejects. 5. For each C i , the sender proves by ZK-PoK that he knows r i such that
The jth Transfer Phase 1. The receiver chooses a choice index 1 ≤ σ j ≤ n based on M σ1 , · · · , M σj−1 . 2. The receiver chooses u randomly and computes U = u N · C σj mod N . 3. The receiver sends U . 4. The receiver proves in WI-PoK that he knows u such that
The protocol stops if the sender rejects. It is easy to construct a 3-round WI-PoK protocol for this based on [4] . 5. The sender computes V = U 1/N mod N and, then computes T such that
6. The sender sends T , and proves that she knows V satisfying eq. (1) in ZKPoK. The protocol stops if the receiver rejects. We can construct a 4-round ZK-PoK protocol for this based on [3] . Note that it holds that
7. The receiver computes
He finally computes M σj from C σj and r N σj mod N 2 .
In the next subsections, we show a 4-round ZK-PoM and a 4-round ZK-PoK which are used in the initialization phase. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1.
4-round ZK-PoK for
1. P chooses r 1 , · · · , r t ∈ Z * N randomly and computes
It is easy to see that the above protocol satisfies special soundness and special HVZK. Hence we can obtain an efficient 4-round ZK-PoK for R t from [3] .
At step 5 of the initialization phase, we use this 4-round ZK-PoK with t = n. Based on this observation, we show a 4-round ZK-PoM which proves that f N is bijective over Z * N . The common input to (P, V) is N . 1. V chooses x 1 , · · · , x t ∈ Z * N randomly and computes
How to Prove that
V sends y 1 , · · · , y t to P. 2. V proves that he knows each x i by using the Σ-protocol of Sec.5.2.
The completeness is clear. If f N is not bijective, then Pr(V accepts) ≤ 1/2 t . Finally it is easy to prove the zero-knowledgeness.
Extension to Constant Round Non-Adaptive OT n k
It is easy to extend our OT n k×1 s to constant round non-adaptive OT n k s. In this section, we show a constant round non-adaptive OT n k based on ElGamal.
How to Prove Many DDH-tuples
We show a 4-round ZK-PoM which proves that (g, h, U 1 , V 1 ), · · · , (g, h, U k , V k ) are all DDH-tuples.
1. The receiver sends random (a 1 , · · · , a k ). 2. The sender proves that (g, h,
) is a DDH-tuple by using the confirmation protocol of [2] .
The confirmation protocol of [2] is a 4-round ZK-PoM on a DDH-tuple. Hence the above protocol runs in 4-round. (Step 1 and the 1st round of the confirmation protocol are merged.)
) is a DDH-tuples with negligible probability. Proof. Assume that U i = g xi and
Suppose that (g, h, U 1 , V 1 ) is not a DDH-tuples. That is, x 1 = y 1 . Then for any values of a 2 , · · · , a k , there exists a unique a 1 such that
Hence the numbers of (a 1 , · · · , a k ) which satisfies eq. (2) is equal to q k−1 . Therefore Pr(eq.(2) holds) = q k−1 /q k = 1/q.
This means that (g, h,
) is a DDH-tuples with negligible probability.
Theorem 3. The above protocol is a ZK-PoM on many DDH-tuples.
Proof. The completeness is clear. The zero-knowledgeness follows from that of the confirmation protocol of [2] . The soundness follows from Lemma 1 and that of the confirmation protocol of [2] .
Constant Round OT n k
In this section, we modify our OT n k×1 to obtain a constant round OT n k as follows.
-At step 4 of the initialization phase, the sender sends (G, h, A 1 , · · · , A n ).
-At the end of the transfer phase, the sender sends (B 1 , · · · , B n ). -In the transfer phase, run step 3 in parallel (still it is a WI protocol).
At step 5, the sender proves that (g, h, U 1 , V 1 ), · · · , (g, h, U k , V k ) are all DDHtuples by using the ZK-PoM of Sec.6.1.
Theorem 4. The proposed OT
n k is a constant round fully-simulatable OT n k under the DDH assumption.
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
We first prove that the proposed scheme is secure against sender corruption. We next prove that it is secure against receiver corruption.
Security Against Sender Corruption
Lemma 2. The proposed scheme is secure against sender corruption.
Proof. For every real-world adversary A who corrupts the sender, we construct an ideal-world adversary A such that Adv(Z) is negligible.
We will consider a sequence of games Game 0 , Game 1 , · · · , Game 4 , where Game 0 is the real world experiment of Sec.3, and and Game 4 is the ideal world experiment, respectively. Let
